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Defining Religion:  
 
The Indian Supreme Court and Hinduism 
 
RONOJOY SEN 
The Times of India, New Delhi1 
 
In this paper I examine how the Supreme Court in independent India has 
defined Hinduism and the consequences that flow from attempts to define 
Hinduism. The Court’s proclivity to define religion, especially Hinduism, 
can be seen as flowing partly from Articles 25 and 26 — often referred to as 
the freedom of religion clauses — of the Indian Constitution. Article 25 
guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion”, but also 
permits the state to regulate “economic, financial, political or other secular 
activity associated with religious practice” as well as provide for “social 
welfare and reform” of Hindu religious institutions.2 Article 26 guarantees 
religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their 
religious affairs.3 Since the “wording of Articles 25 and 26 establishes the 
primacy of public interests over religious claims and provides a wide scope 
for governmentally sponsored reforms,”4 the Supreme Court has often had 
                                                 
1
 Ronjoy Sen received his Ph.D. in Political Science in 2005 from the University of 
Chicago and was a South Asia Fellow at the East West Center, Washington in 2005. He is 
currently Assistant Editor for the Times of India in New Delhi. 
2
 Article 25 (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to other provisions of this 
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to 
profess, practice and propagate religion. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the state 
from making any law —  
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which 
may be associated with religious practice; 
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious 
institutions of a public character to all classes of and sections of Hindus. 
3
 Article 26 states: Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious 
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right – 
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; 
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; 
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and 
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law. 
4
 Marc Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 247. 
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to adjudicate on which religious denomination or institution legally qualifies 
as Hindu. 
I propose that the Supreme Court rulings on what does and does not 
qualify as Hindu are embedded in a discourse on classical or high Hinduism 
that originated with the nineteenth century reformation of Hinduism. For the 
greater part of its existence in independent India the Court appropriated this 
discourse about classical Hinduism to emphasize the inclusive and tolerant 
qualities of Hinduism as well as to advocate reform of Hinduism. Perhaps 
the most influential of these rulings was the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Sastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhundardas5 or the Satsangi case. In 
this case Hinduism was memorably described as a “way of life.” This 
understanding of Hinduism would be used in several later court rulings. But 
in the mid-Nineties — when the Nehruvian consensus on secularism had 
been severely shaken by the rise of the Hindu nationalists — the Court in 
the controversial ‘Hindutva’ ruling6 conflated an inclusivist discourse on 
Hinduism with the exclusivist version of Hinduism propounded by Hindu 
nationalists. Though the Hindutva judgment was viewed by some as an 
aberration, I argue that, paradoxically, it was a product of the dominant 
judicial discourse on Hinduism. 
 
Genealogy of ‘Hinduism’ 
It is now commonly accepted that use of the term ‘Hinduism’ or ‘Hindu’ to 
denote a single religious community is of recent origin. As historian Romila 
Thapar points out, “the first occurrence of the term ‘Hindu’ is as a 
geographical nomenclature.”7 The earliest mention of Hindu can be found in 
the inscriptions of the Achaemenid empire which refer to the frontier region 
of the Indus or Sindhu as ‘Hi(n)dush’. Much later, Arabic texts would refer 
to the land across the Sindhu or Indus river as ‘Al-Hind’. W.C. Smith 
writes, “The term hindu, and its dialectical alternative sindhu, are the Indo-
Aryan word for ‘river’, and, as a proper noun, for the great river of the 
northwest of the sub-continent, still known locally as the Sindh and in the 
West through the Greek transliteration as ‘Indus’. As a designation for the 
territory around that river (that is, meaning roughly, ‘India’) the word was 
used by foreigners but not internally, and indeed it (and the Persian 
counterpart ‘Hindustan’, introduced and used by Muslims) is still primarily 
an outsider’s name for the country.”8 
It was only from the nineteenth century that the term Hinduism9 
came to be in vogue. In large measure it was introduced by British scholars, 
                                                 
5
 AIR 1966 SC 1119. 
6
 R.Y. Prabhoo v. P.K. Kunte, AIR 1996 SC 1113 
7
 Romila Thapar, “Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern 
Search for a Hindu Identity,” Modern Asian Studies 23, 2 (1989), 222. 
8
 Wilfred Cantwell Smith The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the 
Religious Traditions of Mankind (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 30. 
9
 The Oxford English dictionary traces the first use of the term ‘Hindooism’ to 1829 in the 
Bengalee and also to an 1858 usage by Indologist Max Mueller. See Richard King, 
“Orientalism and Modern Myth of “Hinduism”’, Numen, vol. 46 (1999), 165. See also John 
Stratton Hawley, “Hinduism and the Fate of India,” Wilson Quarterly (Summer 1991). 
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missionaries and administrators. However, as Frykenberg notes, the term 
Hindu was used by the British in a negative sense to “characterize all things 
in India (especially elements and features found in the cultures and religions 
of India) which were not Muslim, not Christian, not Jewish, or, hence, not 
Western.”10 In this sense, as Frykenberg, as well as Heinrich von 
Stietencron, point out ‘Hindu’ merely supplanted the earlier term ‘gentoo’ 
which was used to designate heathens.11 This meant that the multiplicity of 
beliefs, practices and doctrines within Hinduism was subsumed under one 
omnibus term. But the plurality within Hinduism continued to confound the 
“Western love of definition and neat pigeon-holing.”12 In fact, the narrative 
of Hinduism confounding outsiders has a long history: the famous medieval 
traveler Albiruni (973-1048) was clearly perplexed during his travels in 
India by the diversity among Hindus.13 One of the reasons for this sense of 
confoundment was that unlike other world religions Hinduism is “not a 
linear progression from a founder through an organizational system.”14 
Instead Hinduism can be read as a “mosaic of distinct cults, deities, sects 
and ideas and the adjusting, juxtaposing or distancing of these to existing 
ones, the placement drawing not only on belief and ideas but also on the 
socio-economic reality.”15 Faced with what appeared to them to be a 
bewildering mosaic, Western scholars often resorted to metaphors like the 
‘jungle’ or ‘sponge’ to map Hinduism.16 
At the same time, the British made a distinction between the living 
religion of the Hindus and what was characterized as the purer Vedic 
religion. P.J. Marshall points out from the latter half of the eighteenth 
century the “Europeans had begun to make the distinction, which was to 
have so long a life, between what they regarded as ‘popular’ Hinduism and 
‘philosophical’ Hinduism. Popular cults were described to be condemned or 
ridiculed, but most writers were also prepared to admit the existence of 
metaphysical assumptions and ethical doctrines in Hinduism which they 
could approve because they seemed to be similar to western concepts.”17 
Through the nineteenth century European scholars contributed profoundly 
to the modern construction of Hinduism by first “locating the core of Indian 
religiosity in certain Sanskrit texts” and second by defining Hinduism based 
                                                 
10
 Robert Eric Frykenberg, “The Emergence of Modern ‘Hinduism’ as a Concept and as a 
Institution: A Reappraisal with Special Reference to South India,” in Gunther D. 
Sontheimer and Herman Kulke eds., Hinduism Reconsidered (New Delhi: Manohar 
Publications, 1991), 31. 
11
 Heinrich von Stietencorn, “Hinduism: On the Proper Use of a Deceptive Term,” in 
Sontheimer and Kulke (1991), 13. 
12
 Percival Spear, cited in Ronald Inden, Imagining India (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2000), 85. 
13
 Arvind Sharma, “On Hindu, Hindustan, Hinduism and Hindutva,” Numen, Vol. 49 
(2002), 7. 
14
 Thapar (1989), 216. 
15
 Ibid., 216. 
16
 See Inden (2000), chapter 3, for the use of metaphors by Europeans to describe 
Hinduism. 
17
 P.J. Marshall, “Introduction,” in Marshall ed., The British Discovery of Hinduism in the 
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 20. 
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upon “contemporary Western understandings of the Judeo-Christian 
traditions.”18 
The search by Hindu intellectuals for a more pure form of Hinduism 
was initiated by Rammohun Roy (1772-1833), who is recognized as a 
seminal figure in the reform of Hinduism and hailed as the ‘father’ of 
modern India. Roy, who was a passionate critic of polytheism, idolatry and 
practices like sati, identified the Vedas and Upanishads as the true sources 
of Hinduism. He writes, “The whole body of Hindu Theology, Law, and 
Literature, is contained in the Veds, which are affirmed to be coeval with 
the creation… But from its being concealed within the dark curtain of the 
Sungscrit language, and the Brahmins permitting themselves alone to 
interpret, or even to touch any book of the kind, the Vedant, although 
perpetually quoted, is little known to the public: and the practice of few 
Hindoos indeed bears the least accordance with its precepts.”19 By 
translating the Sanskrit texts into Bengali, Roy wanted to strike a blow 
against those who “prefer custom and fashion to the authorities of their 
scriptures, and therefore continue, under the form of religious devotion, to 
practice a system which destroys, to the utmost degree, the natural texture of 
society, and prescribed crimes of the most heinous nature…”20 
This ‘cleansing’ of Hinduism and an adoption of, what Thapar has 
referred to as, the Semitic model would be a recurrent theme among Hindu 
reformers in the nineteenth century and later. According to Frykenberg, 
Indian reformers and leaders from Roy to Jawaharlal Nehru used the terms 
Hindu and Hinduism in the ‘Brahminical’ or ‘classical’ sense. Ashis Nandy 
et al describe the primary feature of the “new Hinduism” of the nineteenth 
century thus: “[I]t defensively rejected or devalued the little cultures of 
India as so many indices of the country’s backwardness and as prime 
candidates for integration within the Hindu/national mainstream. Instead, 
the new Hindus sought to chalk out a new pan-Indian religion called 
Hinduism that would be primarily classical, Brahmanic, Vedantic and, 
therefore, not an embarrassment to the modern or semi-modern Indians in 
touch with the more ‘civilized’ parts of the world.”21 
The brief discussion of the genealogy of the term ‘Hinduism’ makes it 
apparent that the Supreme Court was entering into a contested terrain when 
it attempted to define Hinduism. As Arvind Sharma puts it in an 
introduction to a recent anthology on Hinduism, “The problem of defining 
Hinduism has been endemic in the study of Hinduism since the term 
Hinduism was coined and introduced early in the nineteenth century. It has, 
                                                 
18
 King (1999), 166. 
19
 Bruce Carlisle Robertson ed., The Essential Writings of Raja Rammohun Roy (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.  
20
 Ibid., 36-37. 
21
 Ashis Nandy, Shikha Trivedy, Shail Mayaram, Achut Yagnik, Creating a Nationality: 
The Ramjanambhumi Movement and Fear of the Self (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 58. 
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however, increasingly become more acute.”22 In the subsequent discussion 
of the judicial discourse on Hinduism, I intend to show that the Court 
assigned a critical role to many of the dominant assumptions of the 
reformist and neo-Hinduism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
At this point it might be useful to make a distinction between two 
strands of reformist Hinduism: an ‘inclusivist’ and an ‘exclusivist’ model. 
The most prominent proponents of an inclusivist Hinduism were Swami 
Vivekananda (1863-1902) and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975). 
Vivekananda, the founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, probably did most 
to shape the discourse on Hinduism in modern India as well as popularise 
Hinduism in the West. Radhakrishnan, a distinguished philosopher who 
taught at Oxford23 and later became President of India (1962-67), would 
develop many of Vivekananda’s ideas on Hinduism. Both of then forcefully 
argued for Hinduism as a universal and tolerant religion founded on the 
Vedas. These ideas would play a central role in the Court’s understanding of 
Hinduism. However, I argue that the Court, by adopting the inclusivist 
model of Hinduism, also contributed to the construction of a homogenous 
Hinduism which was inimical to variations in beliefs, practices and 
doctrines. In this paradoxical sense the Court’s understanding of Hinduism 
overlapped with the exclusivist strand associated with the founder of 
contemporary Hindu nationalism, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966) 
and his notion of ‘Hindutva’ (Hinduness), a strand which I will discuss at 
greater length below. Before turning to an analysis of the court’s definition 
of Hinduism I will briefly outline the inclusivist and the exclusivist models 
of Hinduism. One must keep in mind, however, that there are significant 
common features in the models which contributed in part to the Court’s 
conflation of Hinduism with Hindutva. 
 
Inclusivist Hinduism 
The Frenchman Francois Bernier, who visited India between 1656 and 
1668, wrote of the pluralism of Hinduism and tolerance of the Hindus.24 
However, the conceptual framework for the inclusive model of Hinduism 
was laid at the end of the nineteenth century by the eminent Oxford 
Sanskritist Monier Monier-Williams (1819-1899).25 In his influential book, 
Religious Thought and Life in India, Monier-Williams writes, “It 
[Hinduism] claims to the one religion of humanity, of human nature, of the 
entire world. It cares not to oppose the progress of any other system. For it 
has no difficulty in including all other religions within its all-embracing 
                                                 
22
 Arvind Sharma, “What is Hinduism?” in Arvind Sharma ed., The Study of Hinduism 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 1-2. 
23
 Radhakrishnan taught Eastern religion and ethics at Oxford from 1936-52. He also held 
teaching and administrative positions at Calcutta University, Mysore University and 
Benaras Hindu University. 
24
 Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire 1656-1668 (New Delhi: Oriental Reprint, 
1983). 
25
 Sir Monier Monier-Williams was in 1860 elected the Boden Professor of Sanskrit at 
Oxford edging out Max Mueller to the prestigious post. One of Monier-William’s major 
achievements was the establishment of the Indian Institute at Oxford. 
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arms and ever-widening fold.”26 He describes the Hindu religion as one 
“based on the idea of universal receptivity” which has “first borne with and 
then, so to speak, swallowed digested, and assimilated something from all 
creeds.”27 In a more recent reformulation, the German Indologist, Paul 
Hacker, argued that the inclusivism (Inklusivismus) associated with 
Hinduism is often confused with tolerance. According to Hacker, 
inclusivism “consists in claiming for, and thus including in, one’s own 
religion what really belongs to an alien sect.”28 He points out that “it would 
perhaps be more accurate to speak of inclusivism in many cases where we 
are inclined to see Hindu tolerance.”29 Hacker singles out Vivekananda and 
Radhakrishnan as the most notable practitioners of this method of 
inclusivism. Both Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan were also the leading 
proponents of Advaita Vedanta.30 Though Hacker’s additional assertion that 
there was inclusivism rather than tolerance in Indian tradition has been 
contested, his claim about the displacement of tolerance by inclusivism is 
useful in discussing the thoughts of Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan. 
Perhaps the most powerful articulation of the inclusivist model of 
Hinduism was Vivekananda’s now legendary address at the Parliament of 
Religions in Chicago in 1893 where he declared: “I am proud to belong to a 
religion which has taught the world both tolerance and universal acceptance. 
We believe not only in universal toleration but we accept all religions as 
true.”31 This theme of the tolerance and universality of Hinduism, 
specifically Vedantic Hinduism, would find pride of place in several of 
Vivekananda’s speeches. At yet another lecture in America, Vivekananda 
clearly outlined his idea of an inclusivist Hinduism: “Ours, as I have said, is 
the universal religion. It is inclusive enough, it is broad enough to include all 
ideals. All the ideals of religion that already exist in the world can be 
immediately included, and we can patiently wait for all the ideals that are to 
come in the future to be taken in the same fashion, embraced in the infinite 
arms of the religion of the Vedanta (italics added).”32 Thus, the infinite 
capacity to accommodate differences and dissent becomes the principal 
feature of Hinduism. 
“[S]ect after sect arose in India and seemed to shake the religion of the Vedas to its 
very foundations, but like the waters of the seashore in a tremendous earthquake it 
receded only for a while, only to return in all-absorbing flood, a thousand times 
                                                 
26
 Monier Monier-Williams, Religious Thought and Life in India (New Delhi: Oriental 
Books Reprint Corp, 1974), 6. 
27
 Ibid., 57. 
28
 Hacker, cited in Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 404-5. The original essay in German appears in Hacker, 
“Inklusivismus,” in G. Oberhammer ed., Eine Indische Denkform (Vienna: 1983). 
29
 Halbfass (1988), 405. 
30
 See Ibid., 408-409, and Robert N. Minor, “Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and ‘Hinduism’: 
Defined and Defended,” in Robert Baird ed., Religion in Modern India (Delhi: Manohar, 
1991). 
31
 Swami Vivekananda, The Collected Works of Swami Vivekananda I (Calcutta: Advaita 
Ashrama, 1973), 1. 
32
 Vivekananda (1973), Collected Works III, 251-52. 
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more vigorous, and when the tumult of the rush was over, these sects were all 
sucked in, absorbed, and assimilated into the immense body of the mother faith.”33 
 
According to Vivekananda, the Hindu religion was founded on the Vedas 
which “are a series of books which, to our minds, contain the essence of all 
religion.” More importantly he believed that only Vedanta could be the 
basis of a universal religion. “[O]ur claim is that the Vedanta only can be 
the universal religion, that it is already the existing universal religion in the 
world, because it teaches principles and not persons. No religion built upon 
a person can be taken up as a type by all the races of mankind… Now, the 
Vedantic religion does not require any such personal authority. Its sanction 
is the eternal nature of man, its ethics are based upon the eternal spiritual 
solidarity of man, already existing, already attained and not to be 
attained.”34 
Despite his professed openness to other religions, Vivekananda believed in 
the superiority of Hinduism. At a speech in Madras, he said, “Ours is the 
religion of which Buddhism with all its greatness is as rebel child, and of 
which Christianity is a very patchy imitation.”35 Harking back to the theme 
that Vedantic religion represented eternal truths, Vivekananda emphasized 
that only Hinduism had the potential of being a universal religion: “You 
hear claims made by every religion as being the universal religion of the 
world. Let me tell you in the first place that perhaps there never will be such 
a thing, but if there is a religion which can lay claim to be that, it is only our 
religion and no other, because every other religion depends on some person 
or persons… But the truths of our religion, although we have persons by the 
score, do not depend upon them.”36 
For Vivekananda, the Vedas were also the fundamental unifying force 
among Hindus belonging to different sects. Addressing a gathering in 
Lahore in 1897 Vivekananda spoke on ‘The Common Bases of Hinduism’: 
“Perhaps all who are here will agree on the first point that we believe the 
Vedas to be the eternal teachings of the secrets of religion. We all believe 
that this holy literature is without beginning and without end, coeval with 
nature, which is without beginning and without end; and that all our 
religious differences, all our religious struggles must end when we stand in 
the presence of that holy book; we are all agreed that this is the last court of 
appeal in all our spiritual differences.”37 
In keeping with his belief in a higher religion, Vivekananda castigated, as 
Tapan Raychaudhuri puts it, the “mindless imbecilities of popular 
Hinduism.”38 To quote once again from Vivekananda’s speech in Madras, 
                                                 
33
 Vivekananda (1973), Collected Works I, 6. 
34
 Vivekananda (1973), Collected Works III, 250. 
35
 Ibid., 275. 
36
 Ibid., 279-80. 
37
 Ibid., 372. 
38
 Tapan Raychaudhuri, “Swami Vivekananda’s Construction of Hinduism,” in William 
Radice ed., Swami Vivekananda and the Modernization of Hinduism (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 12. 
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“The fact is that we have many superstitions, many bad spots and sores on 
our body – these have to excised, cut off, and destroyed – but these do not 
destroy our religion, our national life, our spirituality. Every principle of 
religion is safe, and the sooner these black spots are purged away, the better 
the principles will shine, the more gloriously.”39 
Many of Vivekananda’s ideas on Hinduism, especially its capacity to 
assimilate, its unique role as a universal religion and the centrality of the 
Vedas, would be distilled by Radhakrishnan to define Hinduism as a “way 
of life” rather than a religion. Radhakrishnan has written how as a young 
student he was profoundly affected by Vivekananda and his mentor 
Ramakrishna Paramahansa. In the famous Upton lectures at Oxford in 1926, 
Radhakrishnan famously described Hinduism thus: “Hinduism is more a 
way of life than a form of thought. While it gives absolute liberty in the 
world of thought it enjoins a strict code of practice. The theist and the 
atheist, the sceptic and the agnostic may all be Hindus if they accept the 
Hindu system of culture and life (italics added).”40 Radhakrishnan goes on 
to compare Hinduism to a “fellowship” by saying, “Hinduism is not a sect 
but a fellowship of all who accept the law of right and earnestly seek for the 
truth.”41 
Radhakrishnan links the very difficulty of defining Hinduism or finding 
common characteristics to its ability to assimilate and absorb external 
influences. “The ease with which Hinduism has steadily absorbed the 
customs and ideas of peoples with whom it has come into contact is as great 
as the difficulty we feel in finding common features binding together its 
different forms.”42 This assimilative quality of Hinduism, according to 
Radhakrishnan, has enabled it to withstand the onslaught of different people 
and ideas that have poured into India since the earliest times. “Though 
peoples of different races and cultures have been pouring into India from the 
dawn of history, Hinduism has been able to maintain its supremacy, and 
even the proselytising creeds backed by political power have not been able 
to coerce the large majority of Indians to their views.”43 Thus Hinduism has 
“come to be a tapestry of the most variegated tissues and almost endless 
diversity of hues.”44 
For Radhakrishnan, like Vivekananda, the Vedas and Vedanta remained the 
spiritual core of Hinduism through its entire history of development. 
Though Hinduism has continued to develop and grow through the ages, it is 
“not to be dismissed as a mere flow and strife of opinions, for it represents a 
                                                 
39
 Vivekananda (1973), Collected Works III, 279. 
40
 S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 77. 
Radhakrishnan makes a similar statement in the same series of lectures: “While fixed 
intellectual beliefs mark off one religion from another, Hinduism sets itself no such limits. 
Intellect is subordinated to intuition, dogma to experience, outer expression to inward 
realisation. Religion is not the acceptance of academic abstraction or the celebration of 
ceremonies, but a kind of life or experience (italics added).” Radhakrishnan (1957), 15. 
41
 Ibid., 77. 
42
 Ibid., 12. 
43
 Ibid., 12-13. 
44
 Ibid., 20. 
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steady growth of insight, since every form of Hinduism and every stage of 
growth is related to the common background of the Vedanta.”45 He writes 
that “those parts of the new faith which are not in conformity to the Vedic 
Canon tend to be subordinated and gradually dropped out.”46 Again like 
Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan believed that in spite of the surface differences 
there was a fundamental unity among Hindus. The inchoate nature of 
Hinduism does not deter Radhakrishnan from asserting, “In spite of the fact 
that Hinduism has no common creed and its worship no fixed form, it has 
bound together multitudinous sects and devotions into a common 
scheme.”47 
 
Exclusivist Hinduism 
The term ‘neo-Hinduism’ has been used to describe the thought and 
philosophy of a whole range of Hindu reformers and ideologues, including 
Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, Swami Dayanand, Vivekananda, 
Radhakrishnan and Mohandas Gandhi. According to Paul Hacker, neo-
Hinduism was characterized by an invoking of the ‘Hindu tradition’ in 
response to the encounter with the West. However, a crucial element of neo-
Hinduism was a “reinterpretation” of tradition.48 Some scholars have argued 
that the differences among the neo-Hindus were marginal while others are 
of the view that there were fundamental differences in the ideology of the 
several important figures clubbed under the neo-Hindu label.49 My view is 
that a broad distinction can be made between an inclusivist and an 
exclusivist discourse about Hinduism. At the same time the reader should 
keep in mind that inclusivism and exclusivism are not watertight categories. 
Some of the important elements for the framework of the exclusivist 
formulation of Hinduism were provided by nineteenth century figures such 
as Dayanand (1824-1883) and Chattopadhyay. Two features of 
Chattopadhyay and Dayanand’s work would play a significant role in 
Savarkar’s Hindutva ideology: the idea of a Hindu rashtra or nation (as 
opposed to a religion or civilization) and the distinction between a ‘Hindu’ 
(which included Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs) and the ‘Other’ represented by 
Muslims and Christians. As several recent studies have shown 
                                                 
45
 Ibid., 22. 
46
 Ibid., 23. 
47
 Ibid., 54. 
48
 Hacker, cited in Halbfass (1988), 220. 
49
 For instance there are some like Ashis Nandy who believe that Dayanand, Chattopadhyay 
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Chattopadhyay was a crucial figure in the nineteenth century response to 
colonial rule.50 Besides his novels like Anandamath, which is famous for the 
celebrated patriotic hymn ‘Bande Mataram’ and its anti-Muslim rhetoric,51 
Chattopadhyay contributed significantly to laying the ideological 
foundations of a “national religion” based on Hindu ideals. In one of his 
later works, Krsnacaritra, Chattopadhyay sought to reinterpret Krishna as a 
“respectable, righteous, didactic, ‘hard’ god, protecting the glories of 
Hinduism.”52 Dayanand, on the other hand, was much more involved in the 
actual reform and organization of Hinduism. He believed that a regeneration 
of the Hindu community was possible by going back to the Vedic texts and 
with this in mind he founded the Arya Samaj in 1875. Daniel Gold has 
observed that the Samaj “presents one of the closest parallels to Western 
fundamentalism of all the Indian groups… a definite religious group with its 
own leaders, guiding texts and sacraments.”53 At the same time, Dayanand 
made a concerted effort to establish the superiority of Vedic Hinduism54 vis-
a-vis Islam and Christianity55 in works like the Satyarth Prakash56 as well 
as to mobilize Hindus around issues such as ‘reconversion’ (suddhi), cow 
protection and the importance for nationalism of the Hindi language. 
If Chattopadhyay and Dayanand foreshadowed exclusivist Hinduism, then 
undoubtedly the locus classicus of this variety of Hinduism was Savarkar’s 
Hindutva. Savarkar, who was sent to jail by the British government in 1910 
for revolutionary activities, wrote Hindutva while in prison.57 The treatise, 
which was published in 1923, was the product of a period when “the arrival 
of pan-Indian electoral politics had created a space for a political definition 
of the Hindus that could be more exclusivist.”58 Like many Hindu 
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intellectuals before him, Savarkar, too, engaged with the problem of how to 
define ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Hindu’. In tracing the origin of the term ‘Hindu’, 
Savarkar refused to accept standard interpretations that held that the term 
was coined by outsiders to describe the people living across the Indus river. 
In his seminal text, Hindutva, he wrote, “Thus Hindu would be the name 
that this land and the people that inhabited it bore from time immemorial 
that even the Vedic name Sindhu is but a later and secondary form of it.”59 
The key innovation by Savarkar was that “the concept of Hindu is 
given a predominantly territorial component, a concept of holy land is 
specifically introduced in a fashion that would create a stratarchy of 
Indians.”60 “We have found,” Savarkar writes, “the first important essential 
qualification of a Hindu is that to him the land that extends from Sindhu to 
Sindhu is the Fatherland (Pitribhu), the Motherland (Matribhu) the land of 
his patriarchs and forefathers.”61 More importantly, Savarkar specified that 
the “Dharma of a Hindu being so completely identified with the land of the 
Hindus, this land to him is not only a Pitribhu but a Punyabhu, not only a 
fatherland but a holyland.”62 This meant that Muslims and Christians, who 
might have been born in the “common Fatherland”, could not be regarded as 
Hindus: “For though Hindustan to them is Fatherland as to any other Hindu 
yet it is not to them a Holyland too. Their Holyland is far off in Arabia or 
Palestine.”63 
Savarkar coined the word ‘Hindutva’ to substitute for Hinduism which, in 
his book, “meant a theory or code more or less based on spiritual or 
religious dogma or system.”64 According to Savarkar it was of paramount 
importance to distinguish between Hinduism and Hindutva: “Hinduism is 
only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva… Hindutva embraces all the 
departments of thought and activity of the whole Being of our Hindu 
race.”65 Savarkar elaborated this notion by ascribing three “essentials” to 
Hindutva – a common nation (rashtra), a common race (jati) and a common 
civilization (sanskriti). This meant that religious belief and practice was 
ascribed a secondary status in Savarkar’s conception of Hindutva. Hence, 
Chetan Bhatt observes, “The displacement of ‘Hinduism’ by Hindutva 
represented a substitutionist logic that strictly demoted religion or religious 
belief. This was both an essential step in his primarily non-religious, 
territorial and racial conception of Hindutva and its most contradictory, 
because at some stage, Muslims and Christians had to be excluded from the 
Hindu nation precisely because of Savarkar’s view of the radically different 
nature of their religion that was seen as coextensive with their identities.”66 
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The exclusivist logic of Savarkar was extended by M.S. Golwalkar. He was 
the most prominent ideologue of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS).67 Founded in 1925, the RSS aimed to revitalize India’s cultural life 
by organizing branches (sakhas) where the country’s youth could learn 
discipline and devotion to the nation. In 1938, two years after he became 
sarsanghchalak (supreme director) of the RSS, Golwalkar published We or 
Our Nationhood Defined. Regarding the origins of the Hindus, Golwalkar 
declared in his book that Hindus came “into this land [Hindusthan] from 
nowhere, but are indigenous children of the soil always, from times 
immemorial and are natural masters of the country.”68 Borrowing from 
extant notions of nationalism, Golwalkar stressed that the ‘Hindu’ nation 
was founded on a defined territory, race, religion, culture and language. This 
concept of the Hindu nation was marked by exclusivity: “All those not 
belonging to the national i.e. Hindu Race, Religion, Culture and Language 
naturally fall out of the pale of ‘National’ Life.”69 Golwalkar’s message to 
the non-Hindus was unambiguous and draconian: 
The non-Hindu peoples in Hindusthan must either adopt the Hindu culture and 
language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain 
no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture i.e. they must not 
only give up their attitude of intolerance and ungratefulness towards this land and its 
agelong traditions but must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion 
instead — in one word they, must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country 
wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, 
far less any preferential treatment – not even citizens’ rights.70 
 
In keeping with this line of thinking, Golwalkar made an ominous reference 
to the example of Nazi Germany and how it had shown that it was 
impossible “for Races and cultures, having differences to the root, to be 
assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for use in Hindusthan to 
learn and profit by.”71 
Balraj Madhok is a figure of the next generation of Hindu nationalism. His 
interpretation of Hindutva is constructed as a leader of the Bharatiya Jan 
Sangh party. 72 Madhok was motivated by a desire to widen the appeal of 
Hindutva. His thinking is affected by post-nationalist, post-independence 
electoral and party competition. The Jan Sangh,73 which was the predecessor 
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to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was founded in 1951. Madhok made an 
effort to downplay Hindutva and to highlight the term ‘Bharatiya’, a 
Sanskrit word for Indian. He wrote, “At the same time there is no sense in 
making a fetish of the word Hindu. Instead of forcing it on those who do not 
like it today, it should be popularized as a synonym of ‘Bharatiya’ in writing 
and speaking.”74 However, he was clear that by the Indian nation he meant 
Hindu rashtra. But at the same time he took a more accommodating 
approach than Savarkar or Golwalkar by stressing that “Christians and 
Muslims living in India are also Hindus if India and Indian culture 
commands their first and foremost allegiance.”75 According to Arvind 
Sharma, this signaled a subtle shift in the understanding of Hindutva: 
“During the period when the Jan Sangh functioned as a party [1951-1979], 
the concept of Hindutva underwent an ideological shift. It took the form of 
identifying India with Hindutva, rather than Hindutva with India.”76 Now 
that the reader has been introduced to the discourse and discursive 
formations with respect to Hindu, Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindu rashtra, 
the analysis can move on to the Court’s definition and understanding of 
Hinduism. 
 
The Satsangi case 
The first case in independent India in which the Supreme Court famously 
attempted to define Hinduism was Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas.77 The 1966 
case involved the Satsangis or followers of Swaminarayan (1780-1830) who 
claimed that their temples did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Bombay 
Harijan Temple Entry Act, 1948. The Act provided that every Hindu temple 
shall be open to Harijans or untouchables. By the time the case reached the 
Supreme Court via a trial court and the Bombay High Court, the Central 
Untouchability (Offences) Act of 1955 had already come into effect. The 
case made by the Satsangis was that the “Swaminarayan sect represents a 
distinct and separate religious sect unconnected with the Hindus and Hindu 
religion, and as such, their temples were outside the purview of the said 
Act”.78 
The Satsangis claimed separate status on four grounds. First, they argued 
that Swaminarayan, the founder of the sect, considered himself as Supreme 
God. Second, it was urged that the Satsangi temples could not be regarded 
as Hindu temples since they were used to worship Swaminarayan and not 
any traditional Hindu deity. Third, it was pointed out that the Satsangis 
propagated the idea that worship of any god other than Swaminarayan was a 
betrayal of faith. Finally, it was contended that there was a procedure of 
initiation (diksha) into the Swaminarayan sect by which a devotee assumed 
a distinct and separate identity. 
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The Court rejected the contention of the Satsangis relying primarily on a 
description of their religious practices by Monier-Williams in his Religious 
Thought and Life in India. Based on its reading of Monier-Williams and 
reports of the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, the Court concluded: “In 
our opinion, the plea raised by the appellants that the Satsangis who follow 
the Swaminarayan sect form a separate and distinct community different 
from the Hindu community and their religion is a distinct and separate 
religion different from Hindu religion is entirely misconceived.”79 However, 
the examination of the religious practices of the Satsangis was somewhat 
incidental in the Court’s ruling. 
Yagnapurushdasji was far more critical for the Supreme Court’s 
construction of Hinduism, a construction that has since become hegemonic 
in judicial discourse. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice P.B. 
Gajendragadkar — who had already authored some of the most important 
judgments on the question of freedom of religion — proceeded to enquire 
“what are the distinctive features of Hindu religion.”80 At the same time, he 
admitted that the question “appears to be somewhat inappropriate within the 
limits of judicial enquiry in a court of law”,81 but he did not allow that 
thought to deter him. Drawing primarily from English language sources, the 
Court put forward the view that Hinduism was “impossible” to define: 
“When we think of the Hindu religion, we find it difficult, if not impossible, 
to define Hindu religion or even adequately describe it. Unlike other 
religions in the world, the Hindu religion does not claim any one God; it 
does not subscribe to any one dogma; it does not believe in one philosophic 
concept; it does not follow any one set of religious rites.” Confronted with 
this amorphous entity, the Court concluded, “[I]t [Hinduism] does not 
appear to satisfy the narrow traditional features of any religion or creed. It 
may broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more (italics 
added).”82 
Once the civilizational or cultural view of Hinduism was posited it 
was not difficult for the Court to construct an all-encompassing version of 
Hinduism that included a variety of creeds and sects. Hence, any reform 
movements, including Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism, were seen as merely 
different sects within Hinduism. 
The development of Hindu religion and philosophy shows that from time to time 
saints and religious reformers attempted to remove from the Hindu thought elements 
of corruption and superstition and that led to the formation of different sects. 
Buddha started Buddhism; Mahavir started Jainism; Basava became the founder of 
Lingayat religion, Dhyaneshwar and Tukaram initiated the Varakari cult; Guru 
Nanak inspired Sikhism; Dayananda founded Arya Samaj, and Chaitanya began 
Bhakti cult; and as a result of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, Hindu religion 
flowered into its most attractive, progressive and dynamic forms. If we study the 
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teachings of these saints and religious reformers, we would notice an amount of 
divergence in their respective views: but underneath that divergence, there is a kind 
of subtle indescribable unity which keeps them within the sweep of the broad and 
progressive Hindu religion.83 
 
Gajendragadkar’s view is, in fact, enshrined in the Constitution where 
Explanation II appended to Article 25 says that the “reference to Hindus 
shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, 
Jain or Buddhist religion”. What is noteworthy is that the Court could well 
have decided Yagnapurushdasji without going into a detailed exegesis of 
Hinduism. As Marc Galanter has pointed out in his analysis of 
Yagnapurushdasji, the Court could have decided the case with reference to 
Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, which empowers the state to overcome 
caste and denominational barriers within Hinduism.84 In any case in an 
earlier judgment the Court had said temple-entry acts prevail over 
denominational claims to exclude outsiders.85 
In Yagnapurushdasji, the Court used a variety of sources to define 
Hinduism. Robert Baird describes the Court’s reasoning thus: “All of the 
authorities to whom appeal is made stress the wide range of Hindu belief 
and practice. That which had been the obstacle to constructing a model of 
Hinduism which would fit the concrete data is turned into one of its major 
characteristics — it is inclusive.”86 Radhakrishnan in particular plays a 
crucial role in shaping the Court’s conception of Hinduism. 
At the outset, Gajendragadkar quotes a question posed by 
Radhakrishnan to get at a definition of Hinduism: “[T]o many Hinduism 
seems to be a name without any content. Is it a museum of beliefs, a medley 
of rites, or a mere map, a geographical expression?”87 To this question, the 
Court offers a geographical solution provided by Radhakrishnan. “The 
Hindu civilization is so called since its original founders or earliest 
followers occupied the territory drained by the Sindhu (the Indus) river 
system corresponding to the North-West Frontier Province and the 
Punjab.”88 According to the Court, Radhakrishnan’s definition of Hindu 
implied residence in a well-defined geographical area. “Aboriginal tribes, 
savage and half-civilized people, the cultured Dravidians and the Vedic 
Aryans were all Hindus as they were the sons of the same mother.”89 
The next step in the Court’s construction of Hinduism is the stress 
on its assimilative and tolerant character, a dominant idea in 
Radhakrishnan’s conception of Hinduism: “Naturally enough it was realized 
by Hindu religion that from the very beginning of its career that truth was 
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many-sided and different views contained different aspects of truth which 
no one could fully express. This knowledge inevitably bred a spirit of 
tolerance and willingness to understand and appreciate the opponent’s point 
of view.”90 The Court also mentions Monier-William’s passage on 
Hinduism’s ability to assimilate “something from all creeds”,91 which has 
already been cited in this paper. 
In formulating this overarching, all-embracing Hinduism, the Court 
privileges another of Radhakrishnan’s major ideas: the “acceptance of the 
Vedas as sole foundation of the Hindu philosophy.” Thus Gajendragadkar 
writes, “Beneath the diversity of philosophic thoughts, concepts and ideas 
expressed by Hindu philosophers… lie certain broad concepts which can be 
treated as basic. The first among these basic concepts is the acceptance of 
the Veda as the highest authority in religious and philosophic matters.”92 
The Court even comes up with a working definition of Hinduism as 
formulated by B.G. Tilak: “Acceptance of the Vedas with reverence; 
recognition of the fact that the means to salvation are diverse; and 
realization of the truth that the number of gods to be worshipped is large, 
that indeed is the distinguishing feature of Hindu religion.”93 
The importance of Yagnapurushdasji was that the Court was interpreting 
Hinduism as an inclusivist religion drawing heavily from the ideas of 
Radhakrishnan and his intellectual predecessors. In this sort of usage, as 
noted earlier, certain features of Hinduism are most important: tolerance, 
universality, a classical core and a search for a fundamental unity. The 
Court’s views on Hinduism and indeed its inclusive nature recurred in 
subsequent judgements. In several important later judgements, the Supreme 
Court relied on the construction of Hinduism as elaborated in 
Yagnapurushdasji. For instance, in Ganpat v. Returning Officer the Court 
declares: “[I]t is necessary to remember that Hinduism is a very broad based 
religion. In fact some people take the view that it is not a religion at all on 
the ground that there is no founder and no one sacred book for the Hindus. 
This, of course, is a very narrow view merely based on the comparison 
between Hinduism on the one side and Islam and Christianity on the other. 
But one knows that Hinduism through the ages has absorbed or 
accommodated many different practices, religious as well as secular, and 
also different faiths.”94 
The inclusive model of Hinduism has also been used to determine 
who qualifies as a Hindu for legal purposes. As Baird notes with respect to 
the application of personal law, the Court has held that the Jains,95 who 
consider themselves distinct from Hinduism, and the Lingayats,96 a ‘lower 
caste’ within Hinduism, would be treated as Hindus. Since 
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Yagnapurushdasji, claims put forward by different Hindu sects to be 
regarded as a separate religion have not found favour with the Court. 
Among the more prominent cases was the denial of the status of a separate 
religion status to the Arya Samaj97 and Ramakrishna Mission.98 Let us 
briefly examine the Ramakrishna Mission case which was interesting for 
two reasons: first the Calcutta High Court accepted the claim of the Mission 
to be a separate religion, but the Supreme Court eventually reversed the 
decision; and second, the Mission’s argument was that Hinduism did not 
qualify as a universal religion. Unlike the Satsangi case where the entry into 
temples was at stake, the Ramakrishna Mission case revolved around the 
limits of state action with regard to institutions run by the Mission. In 
settling the case, the Court was forced to examine the doctrinal content of 
Ramakrishna and Vivekananda’s teachings to decide whether their followers 
could be classified as Hindus. 
 
Ramakrishna Mission Case 
In the Ramakrishna Mission (RKM) case the issue at hand was the West 
Bengal government’s right to interfere in the administration of and 
appointment of teachers to in educational institutions run by the RKM. 
When the case first came up for hearing before a single judge of the Calcutta 
High Court and subsequently before a division bench,99 the lawyers 
representing RKM argued that ‘Ramakrishnaism’ was a minority religion 
and hence covered by Article 30,100 which guarantees minorities control 
over educational institutions. In fact, the lawyers turned around the Court’s 
model of inclusivism elaborated in Yagnapurushdasji and argued that 
‘Ramakrishnaism’ was a “world religion” while Hinduism was not. 
The cult or religion of Shri Ramakrishna Paramahansadeb is that all beings are the 
manifestations of God and all religions are but different paths of reaching God… 
There is no necessity of one surrendering his own religion, be he a Hindu or a 
Christian or Muslim or Jew in order to be a follower of the cult or religion of Shri 
Ramakrishna… Thus in fact, Thakur Shri Ramakrishna preached a World Religion 
which is quite different from all other religions.101 
 
The argument by the RKM lawyers was that Ramakrishna founded a 
“universal” religion which was “meant not for the members of any 
particular caste, creed or religion but for the entire mankind.”102 
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The RKM lawyers pointed to the life of Ramakrishna and his famed 
experimentation with different religions as the prime example of his 
universal beliefs: “Sri Ramakrishna practiced Hinduism and particularly 
Bhakti Yoga — the Path of Love. He, however, did not stop there and 
instead of confining himself within Hinduism and experimenting with other 
paths according to the tenets of Hinduism, embarked upon altogether novel 
experiments in accordance with the principles of other religions.”103 Thus 
Ramakrishna for a brief period “practiced Islam as a devout Muslim” and 
had visions of Christ when he went into a trance. 
Contrary to the Satsangi ruling, the Calcutta High Court agreed that as 
compared to Hinduism Ramakrishnaism was far more inclusive and labelled 
it as a “Religion Universal.” The Court declared, “In order to be a follower 
of Sri Ramakrishna, non-Hindus are not required to embrace Hinduism and 
to undergo Suddhi or other form of purification. He could continue to 
profess and practice his own religion and at the same time be a follower of 
Sri Ramakrishna’s faith.”104 Contrasting ‘Ramakrishnaism’ with Hinduism, 
the Court said: “Hindu religion does never admit any person professing 
another faith and religion such as Muslim, Christian or Buddhism etc. in it 
unless such person gives up his religion to embrace Hinduism.”105 However, 
a follower of Ramakrishna is catholic in his beliefs: “A traditional Hindu 
claims to be a Hindu and Hindu only, and believes in the Vedas only, and 
not in the scriptures of any other religion;… But a follower of the cult or 
religion of Shri Ramakrishna, coming originally from the Hindu fold, 
though a Hindu, claims to be something more at the same time. As a 
follower of Shri Ramakrishna’s Religion Universal, along with the Vedas, 
he accepts also the Holy Koran, the Holy Bible and all other religious 
scriptures to be true.”106 Further, the Court contended that Ramakrishnaites 
reject an “integral part of Hindu religion” — the caste system.107 
In light of the Satsangi ruling and specifically Gajendragadkar’s mention of 
Ramakrishna and Vivekananda as reformers working within the ambit of 
Hinduism, there was every chance that the Calcutta High Court judgment 
would be appealed in the Supreme Court. Indeed ten years after the high 
court ruling, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling. In an article written 
well before the Supreme Court judgment Baird correctly predicted: “The 
inclusive model of Hinduism utilized in the Satsangi and succeeding cases 
could have accommodated the followers of Ramakrishna as well. But, in the 
interests of preserving the religious control of the College, the Calcutta High 
Court modified that model so that the Ramakrishnaites became distinct… 
But in the light of Supreme Court statements on Hinduism as a religious 
category it is difficult to see the Supreme Court affirming this decision.”108 
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Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court based its decision on Yagnapurushdasji 
and the “features of Hindu religion” outlined by the earlier ruling. After 
quoting copiously from Yagnapurushdasji, the Court opined that the 
Calcutta High Court rulings “directly conflict with the aforementioned 
views of the Constitution Bench of Hindu religion in the case of 
Yagnapurushdasji Shastri.”109 The Court also referred to the opinions of 
Vivekananda and writings on Ramakrishna to conclude that they were not 
founders of a separate religion. 
Thus, from what is said of Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda and of their 
religion by great world thinkers and philosophers, the glory of Ramakrishna is that 
he preached and made his principal disciple Swami Vivekananda to preach the 
religion of the Vedanta which is the religion of the Hindus…110 
 
However, the Court did accept that RKM could be “regarded as a religious 
denomination within Hindu religion”111 and could claim the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by Article 26. Thus, the Ramakrishna Mission case is a 
clear example that given the inclusivist model of Hinduism outlined in 
Yagnapurushdasji it is virtually impossible for any religious sect to seek 
exit. Just as the RKM was accorded the status of a denomination within 
Hinduism, so other sects such as the Arya Samaj or the Ananda Margis have 
successfully fought for the right to be recognized as a denomination. But the 
status of a minority religion has been denied in all cases. 
 
The Hindutva ruling 
The ‘Hindutva judgements’ is the collective name given to seven decisions 
handed down by the Supreme Court in 1996. The cases involved twelve 
members of Hindu nationalist parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party and 
Shiv Sena. The twelve members, which included Shiv Sena chief Bal 
Thackeray and then Maharashtra chief minister Manohar Joshi, were 
charged with violating section 123 of the Representation of People Act, 
1951 (RPA) by appealing to Hindutva. Section 123(3) 112 prohibits election 
candidates from appealing for votes on the grounds of religion or religious 
symbols among other things. Section 123(3A) prohibits attempts to promote 
enmity on grounds of religion, race, community or language. On the specific 
question of whether an appeal to Hindutva constitutes a violation of the 
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RPA, the main opinion of the Court was delivered in Prabhoo v. Kunte113 
where Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo, then mayor of Bombay, and his election 
agent, Thackeray, faced charges of a corrupt practice i.e. appealing for votes 
on religious grounds or promoting enmity on religious grounds. 
The Court first dealt with the question of the constitutionality of 
section 123 of the RPA, which was challenged by the appellants. The Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the relevant sections of the RPA on the 
grounds that they were “enacted to so as to eliminate from the electoral 
process, appeals to those divisive factors which arouse irrational passions 
that run counter to the basic tenets of our Constitution, and, indeed of any 
civilised political and social order.”114 Writing for the Court, Justice J.S. 
Verma said: “Under the guise of protecting your own religions, culture or 
creed you cannot embark on personal attacks on those of others or whip up 
low hard instincts and animosities or irrational fears between groups to 
secure electoral victories.”115 
On the basis of speeches by Thackeray,116 the Court held that there 
was an appeal to voters to elect Prabhoo because he was a Hindu. The Court 
also held that one of Thackeray’s speeches included derogatory references 
to Muslims. On these counts, the Court concluded that Prabhoo and 
Thackeray were guilty of corrupt practices.117 However, the most important 
aspect of the ruling was the discussion on the legitimacy of appealing to 
‘Hindutva’ during the election campaign. In discussing Hindutva, Justice 
Verma first went over the definition of Hinduism presented in 
Yagnapurushdasji. Basing his opinion on his reading of the inclusivist 
Hinduism of Yagnapurushdasji and on another later decision,118 Verma 
proceeded to conflate Hindutva with Hinduism by arguing that Hindutva 
was a “way of life” and could not be equated with “narrow fundamentalist 
Hindu religious bigotry.”119 
Thus, it cannot be doubted, particularly in view of the Constitution Bench decisions 
of this Court that the words ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Hindutva’ are not necessarily to be 
understood and construed narrowly, confined only to the strict Hindu religious 
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practices unrelated to the culture and ethos of the people of India, depicting the way 
of life of the Indian people. Unless the context of a speech indicates a contrary 
meaning or use, in the abstract these terms are indicative more of a way of life of the 
Indian people and are not confined merely to describe persons practicing the Hindu 
religion as a faith (italics added).120 
 
In conflating Hindutva with Hinduism, the Court ignored the sacred soil and 
birth/race aspects of Hindutva as defined by Savarkar and Golwalkar. 
The Court, however, did not stop at that. Quoting from an obscure 
book on Indian Muslims,121 Verma then went on to opine that “the word 
‘Hindutva’ is used and understood as a synonym for ‘Indianisation’, i.e. 
development of uniform culture by obliterating the differences between all 
the cultures co-existing in the country.”122 According to the Court, the terms 
Hinduism and Hindutva by themselves did not violate the provisions of the 
RPA. “Considering the terms ‘Hinduism’ or ‘Hindutva’ per se as depicting 
hostility, enmity or intolerance towards other religious faiths or professions, 
proceeds from an improper appreciation and perception of the true meaning 
of these expressions emerging from the discussions in earlier authorities of 
this Court… It is indeed very unfortunate, if in spite of the liberal and 
tolerant features of Hinduism recognized in judicial decisions, these terms 
are misused by anyone during the elections to gain any unfair political 
advantage.”123 But unfortunately, these terms could be and arguably were 
misused in the way specified. 
For the Court, the context in which the terms Hinduism and 
Hindutva were being used and to what end were very important. Thus 
Verma wrote, “It is the kind of use made of these words and the meaning 
sought to be conveyed in the speech which has to be seen and unless such a 
construction leads to the conclusion that these words were used to appeal for 
the votes for a Hindu candidate because he is not a Hindu or not to vote for 
a candidate because he is not a Hindu, the mere fact that these words are 
used in the speech would not bring it within the prohibition of subsection (3) 
or (3A) of Section 123.”124 
Though Verma assimilated Hinduism and Hindutva, he was silent on the 
antecedents of Hindutva. For example, he did not consider Savarkar and 
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Golwalkar’s use of sacred soil and race to include some and exclude others 
as foreigners. However, the intense debate generated by the Hindutva 
judgment brought out some of the important ramifications of the ruling. 
Commentators were troubled by the fact that the Court by inferring the 
meaning of Hindutva from Hinduism had “obscured the historical 
background as well as the contemporary political context”125 of Hindutva. It 
was argued that the Court failed to “recognize that Hindutva as an 
expression has a special meaning and is associated with the social and 
political philosophy of Savarkar and Golwalkar.” 126 It was further pointed 
out that the judgment implied that “Hinduism, the religion of the majority of 
Indians, comes to reflect the way of life of all Indians.”127 
At the other end of the spectrum, the Hindu nationalists were 
jubilant. Soon after Prabhoo, an editorial in the Organiser, the journal of the 
RSS, stated, “The apex court has fully and unambiguously endorsed the 
concept of Hindutva which the [BJP] has been propounding since its 
inception.”128 The BJP referred to the judgment in the party’s 1999 election 
manifesto: “Every effort to characterize Hindutva as a sectarian or exclusive 
idea has failed as the people of India have repeatedly rejected such a view 
and the Supreme Court, too, finally, endorsed the true meaning and content 
of Hinduism as being consistent with the true meaning and definition of 
secularism.” 
Much of the debate around the Hindutva ruling centred on the 
Court’s role in conferring legitimacy on the use of Hindutva in the public 
sphere. There was also some discussion on what the judgment, and indeed 
legislation like the RPA, meant for the Indian model of secularism. For 
instance, Pratap Bhanu Mehta believes that both the Hindu nationalists and 
their critics were united in their fear of religion as a “site of destructive 
passion.”129 Mehta points out, “It seems that in India both ‘secular’ and 
‘non-secular’ share the fear of unregulated religious exchange… and both 
have no compunctions in giving the state powers to regulate religious 
speech.”130 Taking a different line, Gary Jacobsohn argues that for Verma 
secularism means “equal treatment under the law” and that this is more 
“consistent with familiar Western norms of liberal democracy.”131 I do not 
wish to enter into this debate but rather examine the Court’s conflation of 
Hinduism with Hindutva, which was one of the striking aspects of Prabhoo. 
In the next section of this paper I look at how it was possible for the Court 
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to appropriate the ‘inclusivist’ Hinduism of Yagnapurushdasji to justify the 
‘exclusivist’ Hinduism as exemplified by Savarkar’s Hindutva. 
 
Hinduism and Hindutva 
The conflation of Hinduism with Hindutva in Prabhoo hinged on the crucial 
use of the “way of life” metaphor. It is, therefore, appropriate to see how 
this metaphor bridges the inclusivist and exclusivist discourses on 
Hinduism. As indicated earlier, Radhakrishnan was a key figure in 
describing Hinduism as a “way of life” rather than a religion based on 
dogma. In Yagnapurushdasji, Gajendragadkar drew on Radhakrishnan’s 
writings to describe Hinduism as a “way of life.” It is interesting to note that 
around the same time as Yagnapurushdasji, the connection between 
Hindutva and a “way of life” was already being made. In a book published 
in 1969, Balraj Madhok uses the “way of life” metaphor to put forward the 
view that it is “wrong to talk of Hinduism as a religion in the sense in which 
Islam and Christianity are religions.” Why is this so? Taking the cue from 
Radhakrishnan, Madhok writes, “Hinduism is not a very happy expression 
because it creates confusion in the people’s minds about the word Hindu. It 
creates the impression of its being a creed or religion, a particular dogma 
and form of worship, which it is not. It comprehends (sic) within itself all 
the forms of worship prevalent in India which do not interfere with the 
worshipper’s loyalty to India, her culture and tradition, history and great 
men.”132 While Madhok uses Radhakrishnan’s all-inclusive definition of 
Hinduism as a religion without “any dogmatic creed”, he also adds a clause 
of “loyalty” to the Hindu rashtra. In a later work, Madhok again takes 
recourse to Radhakrishnan to explicitly make a connection between 
Hindutva and a “way of life” and also employ Hinduism and Hindutva as 
interchangeable categories: “Hinduism or Hindutva represents a specific 
way of life and a cultural tradition in which different beliefs and thoughts 
have been flourishing and co-existing side by side since the dawn of 
history.”133 
The shift from the inclusivist to the exclusivist discourse, as executed by 
Justice Verma and by Madhok, is possible because at the heart of both the 
discourses lies a project to homogenize Hinduism and deprive it of its plural 
character. This is quite apparent in Savarkar’s formulation of Hindutva. One 
of the fundamental principles of Hindutva was to give it a much broader 
scope than Hinduism, which Savarkar saw as religious or spiritual dogma. A 
major concern of Savarkar in formulating the concept of Hindutva “was to 
avoid the political fall-out of an excessively narrow definition of 
Hinduism.”134 As Savarkar writes in Hindutva, “This is Hindudharma – the 
conclusion of the conclusions arrived at by harmonizing the detailed 
experience of all the schools of religious thought – Vaidik, Sanatani, Jain, 
Baudda (sic), Sikha or Devasamji. Each one and every one of these systems 
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or sects which are the direct descendants and developments of the religious 
beliefs, Vaidik and non-Vaidik, that obtained in the land of the saptasindhus 
or in the other unrecorded communities in other parts of India in the Vedic 
period, belongs to and is an integral part of Hindudharma.”135 Sumit Sarkar 
et al point out with regard to Hindutva: “Exclusion, however, goes along 
with a supreme internal catholicity. All differences of ritual, belief, and 
caste are irrelevant: what matters is not content but origin in (a vaguely and 
arbitrarily defined) Bharatvarsha. Monists, monotheists, polytheists and 
atheists, Sikhs, Arya Samajists, and advocates of Sanatan Dharma, are all 
equally good Hindus for Savarkar.”136 
The Indian Constitution and the Hindu Code Bill (which comprises 
of four different Acts), too, take an undifferentiated view of Hinduism: it 
includes anyone who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew under ‘Hindu’ 
as a legal category.137 Arvind Sharma notes that the “Indian government, 
both in the language of the Indian Constitution adopted in 1950, and 
subsequent legislation, has virtually adopted the Hindutva definition of a 
Hindu — as one who belongs to any religion of Indian origin.”138 At one 
level, it could be argued, that the Court with its inclusive model was merely 
reinforcing the Constitutional (and legislative) view of Hinduism. But the 
Court — with the Hindutva ruling — goes beyond the Constitutional 
stipulation and uses the inclusive model to identify Hinduism (and Hindutva 
as well) with “Indianisation” and development of a “uniform culture.” 
The Court could make the argument about a “uniform culture” 
because there is an implicit case for uniformity and homogenization in the 
inclusivist model of Hinduism. Hacker identifies “a peculiar mixture of 
doctrinal tolerance and intolerance” as a crucial aspect of neo-Hindu 
thought. Thus the inclusivism of the neo-Hindus can be characterized as 
appropriation of differences rather than recognition of differences. This 
“intolerance” to difference is very much a part of the judicial discourse and 
is best captured by Gajendragadkar’s summing up of Yagnapurushdasji: “It 
may be conceded that the genesis of the suit is the genuine apprehension 
entertained by the appellants, but as often happens in these matters the said 
apprehension is founded on superstition, ignorance and complete 
misunderstanding of the true teachings of Hindu religion and of the real 
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significance of the tenets and philosophy taught by Swaminarayan 
himself.”139 
This aversion to “superstition” and popular practices and a search for 
the “true teachings” of Hinduism is an important element in the thinking of 
most Hindu reformers starting from Rammohun Roy in the early nineteenth 
century. Radhakrishnan unequivocally states, “In the name of toleration we 
have carefully protected superstitious rites and customs.”140 Though he 
argues that Hinduism’s method of assimilation is “essentially 
democratic,”141 there is a hierarchical structure determining the entire 
process: “Every God accepted by Hinduism is elevated and ultimately 
identified with the central Reality which is one with the deeper self of 
man… Hinduism absorbs everything that enters into it, magic or animism, 
and raises it to a higher level.”142 The “central reality” of Hinduism is 
represented by the Vedas which Radhakrishnan (and indeed many of the 
earlier Hindu reformers) believe is the “basis of Hindu religion.” 143 Because 
of the Vedic core of Hinduism, Radhakrishnan could assert that “differences 
among the sects of Hindus are more or less on the surface” and that the 
Hindus “as such remain a distinct cultural unit, with a common history, a 
common literature and a common civilization.”144 In a similar vein, 
Gajendragadkar finds a “subtle indescribable unity” within the “divergence” 
of Hinduism. In the Court’s definition of Hinduism in Yagnapurushdasji, 
too, “acceptance of the Vedas” is a key element. The appeal to the Vedas is 
convenient because the “Vedic texts contain no Hindu dogma, no basis for a 
‘creed’ of Hinduism, no clear guidelines for the ‘Hindu way of life’.”145 It is 
precisely the open-endedness of the Vedic texts which make them the 
perfect ally of Hindu reformers as well as the Court in their quest to 
construct a more homogenized and rational Hinduism. 
 
Conclusion 
It can be argued that the convergence of the inclusivist and exclusivist 
discourses on interpreting Hinduism as a “way or life” and on the project of 
homogenizing Hinduism is a possible explanation for the Court’s conflation 
of Hinduism and Hindutva. However, it is also vitally important to note that 
this homogenization of Hinduism was inspired by fundamentally different 
visions. In the case of Radhakrishnan, regeneration of Hinduism — in his 
words placing “the whole Hindu population on a higher spiritual plane”146 
— was his primary goal. Similarly Gajendragadkar was interested in 
changes in the “whole social and religious outlook of the Hindu 
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community.”147 In contrast, Savarkar was putting forth a territorial and 
racial conception of Hinduism. Religion per se has little connection with 
Savarkar’s conception of Hindutva: he was not primarily concerned with 
reform of Hinduism but with the political goal of creating a Hindu rashtra 
(nation). 
Hence, when Justice Verma equated Hinduism with Hindutva he 
was not only collapsing the inclusivist and exclusivist models, he was also 
giving a highly political dimension to the judicial discourse on Hinduism.148 
It has already been observed how Prabhoo was welcomed by the Hindu 
nationalists as a vindication of Hindutva. Verma’s additional move of 
equating Hindutva with ‘Indianisation’ gave the Court’s seal of approval, in 
a sense, to the Hindu nationalists’ conception of the nation. This is clearly 
illustrated in the ‘Vision Document’ released by the BJP prior to the last 
general elections in India in 2004. Under the sub-heading ‘Cultural 
Nationalism’ the document states, “Contrary to what its detractors say, and 
as the Supreme Court itself has decreed, Hindutva is not a religious or 
exclusivist concept. It is inclusive, integrative, and abhors any kind of 
discrimination against any section of the people of India on the basis of their 
faith.”149 The BJP, following the Verma judgment, says “Indianness, 
Bharatiyata and Hindutva” must be treated as synonyms.150 
Madhok’s strategy of using ‘Hindutva’ and ‘Bharatiya’ as 
interchangeable categories is now very much the centrepiece of the BJP’s 
ideology. The vision document as well as recent speeches and interviews by 
Hindu nationalist leaders suggest that the language of inclusivism is being 
used to justify Hindutva and an exclusivist agenda. In early 2004, the RSS 
chief K.S. Sudarshan referred to Yagnapurushdasji and said since the 
Supreme Court had said the term ‘Hindu’ referred to a way of life and not a 
religion, Muslims and Christians should be considered as Hindus.151 
In a significant blurring of the boundaries of inclusivism and 
exclusivism, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said in an 
interview, “Hindus cannot be fundamentalists. The Hindu worldview, we 
must remember, is inclusivist, as opposed to the exclusivist worldview of 
other faiths.”152 This brings one back to the point about the convergence of 
the inclusivist and exclusivist discourses in the Court’s reading of 
Hinduism. Thus, the inclusivist discourse on Hinduism, as understood by 
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Radhakrishnan or Gajendragadkar, has lent itself to interpretations that build 
on their failure to recognise India’s composite and syncretistic culture. 
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